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SiGNS OF THE COEFFiCiENTS
Tables A-i and A-2 give expected signs and actual signs for each
coefficient included in the final reruns. For some coefficients, under
the column headed "expected sign," a priori considerations ran in
both directions and their net weight was not clear. With respect
to b3 (average term) and b13 (maturity), for example, the cross-
TABLE A-i
Industrials: Ten Regression Coefficients, Expected





Coefficient Sign CrossSections Regression
b2 - — . -
.b3 b. . •-







• b — —
b12 — — —
b13 b . . . —
b15 b .— —
aSee Tables 25 and 26.
bThe net weight of apriori considerations was unclear.136 AppendixA
TABLE A-2
Public Utilities: Ten Regression Coefficients, Expected Sign, Actual




Coefficient Sign CrossSections Regression
b2 — —
b3 b —
b4r + .+ +
b5 + + .+
. b .












aSee Tables 43 and 44.
bThe net weight of a priori considerations was unclear.
section analysis did not hold constant expectations as to the future
course of interest rates. Clearly, an expectation that rates would
decline could be sufficiently strong to outweigh the greater risk
implicit in longer duration. The same kind of consideration applies
to the ratio of long-term debt to total capital, given the fact that
total interest(i.e., total debt) is being held constant. In other
words, given total debt, would we expect lenders to prefer a
higher long-term debt ratio or a lower one? So far as utilities are
concerned, would we expect that, other things being equal, yields
on the issues of electric and telephone companies would be higher
or lower than yields on the issues of water and gas distribution
companies? Clearly, questions such as these can be answered only
by reference to the facts.Appendix 4 137
Type of Security
Table A-i indicates that, for industrials, b5 (type of security)
takes the wrong sign. The sign indicates that, other things being
equal, yields are lower on debentures than on mortgage bonds.
This, of course, is the reverse of the finding which had been
expected.
It seems altogether possible that X5 is really measuring those
industry effects not held constant by X6. X6 is simply a dummy
variable (0,1) which merely distinguishes between producers of
durable goods and producers of consumer The b6 coefficient
carried the "right" sign, i.e., yields are lower on the issues of
companies which produce consumer goods. But producers of both
types of goods vary a good deal among themselves with respect,
say, to the stability of earnings. Those who have the better records
(or prospects) tend, doubtless, to be more likely to be able to
obtain funds on their general credit. In brief, X5 is probably acting
as a proxy for those industry effects not held constant by X6 as
defined. This hypothesis finds some support in the fact that b5 for
utilities carries the right sign (Table A-2); X0 for utilities holds
industry effects much more closely constant than does X6 for
industrials.'
It would not have been possible to dummy in the thirty-odd
two-digit classes for industrials without reducing degrees of freedom
w'li below zero.
Years Nonrefundable
This coefficient was positive for both industrials and utilities.
Neither was very large: a change of one standard deviation in X7
would be capable of affecting yield by something less than 1 per
cent. Nevertheless the sign is clearly positive.
Both b5,s decline in importance after 1955. Over the period, lenders seem to
have cared less about differences in the stability of earnings—perhaps because
those differences became smaller (Charts D-1 and D-2). -138 Appendix A
The simple correlation between yield and X7 was predominantly
negative for industrials and predominantly positive for utilities.
This was true for industrials primarily because X7 was correlated
positively with the size and duration variables. The larger com-
panies which, in general, pay less for money, get the longer
maturities, and the longer the maturity of an issue, the longer will
be the period of nonrefundability. So far as utilities are concerned,
however, X7 tends not to be correlated to any significant extent
with any other variable (Table 34) and therefore the sign it carries
tends to indicate the direction of its separate effect on yield. In
other words, for industrials, when the effects of the other variables
with which X7 is correlated, are. "partialled out," X7 shows itself
to be positive.
But the question remains: why does yield vary positively with
X7? The numbers which have been used to quantify X7 must in
fact also be measuring something else which, a priori, would
vary positively with yield but which is not included in the regres-
sions. Bargaining strength might be one such variable:if two
issues are identical in every respect, but the issuer of the first
happens to be in a relatively weaker bargaining position than the
issuer of the second, that issuer will pay a relatively, higher price
for money and may find himself also forced to accept a longer
period of nonrefundability. In such a case, the longer period of
nonrefundability would merely be a measure of his relative bargain-
ing weakness. This hypothesis may or may not be valid, but
should bear in mind that despite the large number of
which has here been taken into account, some variables had,
perforce, to be omitted. Bargaining strength is one and it is not
difficult to think of others on which it would have been equally
difficult to collect quantifiable data.
Industrial Class
The sign on this coefficient for utilities means that, other things
being equal, yields are somewhat lower on the issues of waterAppendix A S 139
and gas distribution companies than on the issues of electric and
telephone companies. This finding is not really surprising. The
simple correlation between yield and X6 (Table 34) was positive,
but as Table 51 suggests, the issues of water and gas distribution
companies are, on the average, of substantially lesser "quality"
than the issues of electric and telephone companies. When "quality"
is equated as between the two types of issues, yields are found to
be somewhat lower on those of water and gasdistribution
companies.
Average Term and Maturity
When maturity (X13) and size of issue (Xs) are held constant,
average, term (X3) measures weighted average amortization, i.e.,
given two issues of the same size and maturity, average term will
be longer on the issue which is amortized later in its life, and
vice versa. Table A-3 illustrates this point for two issues of $1
million and five-years maturity. Issue A, which is amortized in
equal amounts in each year, has an average term of three years.
Issue B, which is not amortized at all in the first three years and
is amortized in equal amounts in years four and five, has an average
term of four and a half years.2 With size and maturity held constant,
average term is thus an unambiguous measure of duration.
However, with average term and size held constant, maturity
has a rather special meaning. If two issues of the same size and
average term differ in maturity, their amortization schedules must
also differ, and the issue with the longer maturity will tend to be
more heavily amortized in the early years of its life. Table A-4
illustrates this point by comparing the amortization schedules of
two issues of the same size and average term but. of different
maturity. Issue A has a maturity of five years and is identical to
Issue A in Table A-3. Issue B, however, has a maturity of ten
years. In order to equate average term on the two issues, amortiza-
2 When an issue is not amortized at all during its life but simply paid off in
full at maturity, average term and maturity are the same.140 AppendixA
TABLE A-3
Comparison of Average Term of $1 Million issue of Five-Years
























tion on the longer issue must be heavier in the earlier,, less-heavily
weighted years. In the illustration, 96.5 per cent of Issue B, but
only 80 per cent of Issue A, is amortized in the first four
Thus, with average term and size held constant, the coefficient on
maturity is assessing the net effect of two opposite influences on
yield—longer final maturity as such and, given that longer life,
heavier amortization in the earlier years of the loan.
The behavior of the coefficients on average term may be sum-
marized as follows:Appendix A 141
I. For industrials (Chart D-1), from mid-1953 to the end of
1958 lenders were offering a premium for longer duration—
presumably because they expected interest rates to decline. After
1958, this premium disappeared.
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duration through the whole period although this preference weak-
ened noticeably after mid-1958. After mid-1958 none of the
coefficients on average term is significant.
The coefficients on maturity are telling us essentially the same
tale, namely, that until 1957—58, a borrower who wanted a longer
maturity had to take a longer average term also in order to avoid
being required to pay a higher yield.
Chart D-1 indicates that until the, second quarter of 1958, the
coefficient on maturity for industrials was predominantly positive.
During this period, it showed eighteen plus and eleven minus signs.
But between the second quarter of 1958 and the fourth quarter
of 1961, it showed thirteen minus signs and just two plus signs.
This sharp change in the behavior of the coefficient between 1958
and 1961 was sufficient to cause the sign to be negative over-all
and, on balance, in the cross sections.
The coefficient for utilities showed sixteen plus signs and six
minus signs in the cross sections and was positive in the over-all
regression. The coefficient was trending strongly downward, how-
ever, and was predominantly positive only until the first. half of
1957. During this period, eleven of thirteen signs were positive.
Thereafter, the coefficient showed five plus and four minus signs—
and a weighted average of the last nine coefficients would carry a
negative sign.
In short, it appears that "something happened" in 1957—5 8 which
caused b3 and b13 for industrials and b13 for utilities to change
sign; it also caused b3 for utilties to weaken substantially.3
What happened in 1957—58 which might explain the change in
the behavior of these coefficients? The answer is, perhaps, not far
to seek. After a trough in mid-1958, interest rates began to rise
sharply (e.g. Chart 8) and at the same time, presumably, expecta-
tions as to their future course changed drastically.
The results here suggest fairly strongly that we should not
Interestingly enough, the coefficient on maturity for finance company place-
ments showed similar behavior. It was positive for the first two cross sections
(1951—54 and 1955—57) but negative in the third (1958—61).Appendix A 143
expect the signs on duration variables to be uniformly positive.
The signs will tend to be determined in large part by current
expectations as to the future course of interest rates.
Long-Term Debt Ratio ..
Thesign on b15 simply indicates that, given total debt, lenders
prefer companies with less short-term and more long-term debt.
This finding can be rationalized readily enough: if a company has
relatively less short-term debt, debt service (interest plus amortiza-
tion) will be less per dollar of total debt, simply because short-term
debt must, in general, be fully amortized within the current year,4
This means that, given total debt, the company with relatively more
long-term debt will have more cash available to service its total
debt.
When the regressions were run with X4 omitted, b15 carried a
plus sign for both industrials and utilities—although, of course,
X4 doubtless acts as a proxy for X15 when the latter is omitted.
Either by net cash outlay or by new borrowing.